In Which Content to Specialize? A Game Theoretic Analysis by Altman, Eitan
HAL Id: hal-01533579
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01533579
Submitted on 6 Jun 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution| 4.0 International License
In Which Content to Specialize? A Game Theoretic
Analysis
Eitan Altman
To cite this version:
Eitan Altman. In Which Content to Specialize? A Game Theoretic Analysis. Networking Workshops
(NETWORKING), May 2012, Prague, Czech Republic. pp.121-125, ￿10.1007/978-3-642-30039-4_15￿.
￿hal-01533579￿
In which content to specialize? A game theoretic
analysis
Eitan Altman
INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis
2004 Route des Lucioles
06902 Sophia Antipolis
France
email: Eitan.AltmanInria.fr
Abstract. Content providers (CPs) may be faced with the question of
how to choose in what content to specialize. We consider several CPs
that are faced with a similar problem and study the impact of their de-
cisions on each other using a game theoretic approach. As the number
of content providers in a group specializing in a particular content in-
creases, the revenue per content provider in the group decreases. The
function that relates the number of CPs in a group to the revenue of
each member may vary from one content to another. We show that the
problem of selecting the content type is equivalent to a congestion game.
This implies that (i) an equilibrium exists within pure policies, (ii) the
game has a potential so that any local optimum of the potential function
is an equilibrium of the original problem. The game is thus reduced to
an optimization problem. (iii) Sequences of optimal responses of players
converge to within finitely many steps to an equilibrium. We finally ex-
tend this problem to that of user specific costs in which case a potential
need not exist any more. Using results from crowding games, we provide
conditions for which sequences of best responses still converge to a pure
equilibrium within finitely many steps.
1 Introduction
We consider in this paper competition over content type between Content Providers
(CPs). We consider the sitation in which each of several CPs has to decide in
what content to specialize. Different types of content may differ by their popu-
larity as well as by the price that idividuals are willing to pay. We may expect
that not all CPs will specialize in the most popular content since the income for
other content may be larger if its distribution is shared among a small number
of CPs.
We first show that this game is equivalent to a congestion game and thus
has a potential. Any local maximizer of the potential is thus an equilibrium, and
equilibrium can be reached by best response sequences within a finite number
of moves [4, 2].
We extend some of these results to player specific costs in which case there
need not be any potential. still a pure equilibrium is seen to exist and we establish
convergence to it within finitely many steps under some conditions.
2 The model
There are M content providers and K content types. We consider below a game
in which each content provider has to decide in what content type it specializes.
We assume that it cannont specialize in more than one type.
Define a multi-policy u = (u1, ..., uM ) where ui is the content type chosen by
CP i, taking an integer value between 1 to K.
Let γi(u) be the utility of content provider i (i = 1, ...,M) when the multi-
policy u is used.
Let m = {m1, ...,mK} be the vector of the number of CPs specializing in
each one of the K content types. We call this the system’s state. We shall denote
by m(u) the state that correspond to a multi-policy u.
We shall assume that the utility of CP i for choosing action k depends on
the system state m only through its kth component mk. i.e. it is a function of
only how many CPs (including i) choose content k. We denote this utility as
J i(k,mk).
Let u be a multi-policy such that ui = k for some i and k and let mk = mk(u).
Then
J i(k,mk(u)) = γ
i(u).
In the next section we shall assume that J i(k,mk) does not depend on i (it
ia then omitted from the notation). This is a game with symmetric utilities (or
costs). This assumption will be relaxed in the following section.
We consider the set satisfying
G(M) := {m : mi ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,M, m1 + ....+mK = M}
Define S(m) = {i : mi 0} to be the support of m, and let ej denote the unit
vector of dimension M with all entries zero except the jth that is one. This set
thus contains all possible states in which each of the M CPs has chosen one
content type between 1 and K..
Definition. m∗ is said to be an equilibrium in the content game if
J(k,m∗k) ≥ J(i,m∗i + 1), ∀k ∈ S(m) and all i 6= k.
3 Analysis of the game
Theorem 1. The following hold:
– (i) There exists a pure equilibrium in the content game.
– (ii) Define the following potential:
V (m) =
K∑
k=1
v(k,mk), where v(k, j) =
j∑
i=1
J(k, i)
Consider the problem of maximizing the potential V , i.e.
Z := max
m∈G(M)
V (m)
Let Q be the subset of G(M) achieving the max. Then any m ∈ Q is an
equilibrium in the content game.
Proof. The content game is equivalent to a congestion game as defined in [3],
where there is one common source and destination, there are M players and K
parallel links and each player has one unit of flow to ship, and has to decide over
which link to send it (it is not possible to split the flow between several links).
The cost for a player to choose link k if there are m players that choose this link
(including itself) is J(k,m). With this equivalence, all statements follow from
[3]. 
Assume next that the following assmption holds:
A1: J(k, i) is decreasing in i for all k.
Under this assumption the game is not only a congestion game but also a
crowding game. As such, we know [2] that that best responses of players converge
within finitely many steps to an equilibrium (provided that players do not
change their strategies simultaneously, and that each player has an opportunity
to update its strategy as long as an equilibrium is not reached). This convergence
property is called the ”Finite Improvement Property” [2].
We next discuss the practical motivaations for Assumption A1 throgh an
example. Assume that each CP can satisfy a demand of L downloads per day.
Let D(k, p) be the Demand (in downloads per day) for type k content, provided
that the price for downloading a unit of such content is p. D is assumed to be
strictly decreasing in the price p. Therefore the following inverse function
P (k, d) = {p : D(k, p) = d}
is well defined. It represents the cost of type k content for which the resulting
demand is of d downloads per days.
If there are m CPs of type k then the available offer for type k content is mL
downloads per day, so that the price of a download that will create a demand
that will match this offer is P (k,mL).
The income of a type k CP when there are m CPs specializing in that content
is then given by
J(k,m) := LP (k,mL).
4 Extensions
We study an extension to games with non-symmetric costs and then briefly
suggest an extension to the elastic case.
4.1 Player specific costs
In [1] we have studied game problems involving two types of content providers:
one that corresponds to independent content providers, and one that corre-
spond to content providers that have exclusive agreements with Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). The cost for the Internauts who are subscribers of some ISP of
fetching content from an independent CP or from ma CP that has an exclusive
agreement with another ISP, was assumed to be larger than for fetching it from
the a CP that has an exclusive agreement with their own ISP. This impilies that
the revenues (and thus the utility) of a CP may depend on its type (independent
or not).
This motivates us to allow the utility function that corresponds to choosing
some content to be player specific. We thus abandon the assumption of indis-
tinguishability. The game is no more a congestion game and need not have a
potential any more. The utility J i(k,mk) may depend now on i.
Still the following holds:
Theorem 2. Assume A1. The following holds in the case of player dependent
costs:
– (i) There exists a pure equilibrium in the content game.
– (ii) In case that there are only two types of contents, the finite improvement
property still holds.
The proof follows Theorems 1 and 2 of [2].
4.2 Other extension
Both the results of the previous Section as well as the previous subsection have
been derived for the case where all CPs participate. We next show how to apply
them to the elastic case, i.e. where the offer for content may be a function of
the utility that a CP receives. We wish to model a situation in which some CPs
may prefer not to participate, if their income goes below some threshold.
We vary the model as follows. We add a new action ”0” to each player, which
corresponds to having an option of not participating in the game. In addition,
we consider a fixed additional cost ci ≥ 0 for player i to participate in the game
(which may correspond to the investment and maintainance costs). This problem
can again be solved with the help of the equivalent congestion game, in which
we add an additional parallel link of a fixed cost 0, and where we add c to the
cost of each other link. Thus the same results as obtained previously still hold.
5 Conclusions
We have shown how various problems related to competition over content can
be reduced to congestion games and/or to crowding games. This allowed us to
derive the structure of equilibria and convergence to equilibria within finitely
many improvement steps.
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